You’re absolutely right that China is a central target but this goes beyond just trade. It’s also about Europe, Mexico, Canada, Vietnam, and others. What we’re seeing is a broader rejection of the post-Cold War globalist architecture including on trade and multilateral institutions and global security commitments. China is simply the most visible and successful embodiment of that world.
Ironically, China has benefited enormously from the U.S. led global system even as it critiques elements of American hegemony. Access to U.S. markets, global maritime stability, dollar-based finance, and WTO membership were all critical to China’s economic rise. That’s not a criticism, just a recognition of how deeply interconnected the old order was.
Now, as U.S. growth becomes increasingly deficit-driven, we’re seeing a shift to a “pay-to-play” access model. The logic is straightforward. If you're going to profit from U.S. markets and the global infrastructure it underwrites, you're expected to contribute to the system either by re-shoring jobs or by absorbing part of the tax burden once carried by American workers. This isn’t protectionism for its own sake. It is a fundamental rethinking of how the United States sustains its economic model.
What’s being challenged isn’t just trade balances or specific bilateral relationships. It’s the legacy model where the U.S. underwrote global prosperity while allowing domestic industries to hollow out. That model is being replaced. The emerging framework is transactional, centered around reciprocity, contribution, and accountability.
It may feel adversarial, but in many ways it’s a recalibration and one that reflects new domestic political realities and economic pressures rather than old ideological battles.
China, and many Canadian politicians as I’ve noticed, tend to frame this as an attack. But I would encourage everyone to take a step back and consider the broader context.
It’s important to note that I don’t see this shift changing once Trump leaves office. The pressures driving this recalibration aren’t about a single administration. They reflect long-term structural changes in the U.S. economy and its role in the world.
It's wild to me to see that there are still Westerners out there who are making the same old claims that China can't innovate and only make shoddy knock-offs. Most ironically, I have met people actually involved in the process of Chinese innovation who make those same blathering pronouncements. It's as if such opinion was implanted into their brains and needs to be extracted by force.
I would not have expected that in 2025 I'd be reading Chinese writers deftly explaining my own country's faults (while many of my countrymen are, frankly, on some bullshit), but here we are. Congrats on being published in the NYT; good to see you're taking all the responses to your piece in stride. I think I'd freak out a little if people were having some of those reactions to something I wrote.
And, FWIW, even in these strange and uncertain times, I can share that some of my American colleagues are currently visiting China while some of our Chinese colleagues are here visiting our US facility, all working to improve communication and share knowledge so we can have greater success. We might all be eating bitterness for a while, but we're going to get through this and profit.
The Mufeng article is really interesting in contrast to US commentary on the same issues. In particular, why is the Biden administration effort to bring back high end manufacturing through subsidies not mentioned? The Trump administration may already have destroyed these efforts, but subsidies are much more feasible than taxes in the US political system.
I agree that it is really interesting. The perspective is different from all the many articles I have read from US writers. I have one question: what is G2?
You’re absolutely right that China is a central target but this goes beyond just trade. It’s also about Europe, Mexico, Canada, Vietnam, and others. What we’re seeing is a broader rejection of the post-Cold War globalist architecture including on trade and multilateral institutions and global security commitments. China is simply the most visible and successful embodiment of that world.
Ironically, China has benefited enormously from the U.S. led global system even as it critiques elements of American hegemony. Access to U.S. markets, global maritime stability, dollar-based finance, and WTO membership were all critical to China’s economic rise. That’s not a criticism, just a recognition of how deeply interconnected the old order was.
Now, as U.S. growth becomes increasingly deficit-driven, we’re seeing a shift to a “pay-to-play” access model. The logic is straightforward. If you're going to profit from U.S. markets and the global infrastructure it underwrites, you're expected to contribute to the system either by re-shoring jobs or by absorbing part of the tax burden once carried by American workers. This isn’t protectionism for its own sake. It is a fundamental rethinking of how the United States sustains its economic model.
What’s being challenged isn’t just trade balances or specific bilateral relationships. It’s the legacy model where the U.S. underwrote global prosperity while allowing domestic industries to hollow out. That model is being replaced. The emerging framework is transactional, centered around reciprocity, contribution, and accountability.
It may feel adversarial, but in many ways it’s a recalibration and one that reflects new domestic political realities and economic pressures rather than old ideological battles.
China, and many Canadian politicians as I’ve noticed, tend to frame this as an attack. But I would encourage everyone to take a step back and consider the broader context.
It’s important to note that I don’t see this shift changing once Trump leaves office. The pressures driving this recalibration aren’t about a single administration. They reflect long-term structural changes in the U.S. economy and its role in the world.
Refreshing views.
It's wild to me to see that there are still Westerners out there who are making the same old claims that China can't innovate and only make shoddy knock-offs. Most ironically, I have met people actually involved in the process of Chinese innovation who make those same blathering pronouncements. It's as if such opinion was implanted into their brains and needs to be extracted by force.
I would not have expected that in 2025 I'd be reading Chinese writers deftly explaining my own country's faults (while many of my countrymen are, frankly, on some bullshit), but here we are. Congrats on being published in the NYT; good to see you're taking all the responses to your piece in stride. I think I'd freak out a little if people were having some of those reactions to something I wrote.
And, FWIW, even in these strange and uncertain times, I can share that some of my American colleagues are currently visiting China while some of our Chinese colleagues are here visiting our US facility, all working to improve communication and share knowledge so we can have greater success. We might all be eating bitterness for a while, but we're going to get through this and profit.
The Mufeng article is really interesting in contrast to US commentary on the same issues. In particular, why is the Biden administration effort to bring back high end manufacturing through subsidies not mentioned? The Trump administration may already have destroyed these efforts, but subsidies are much more feasible than taxes in the US political system.
I agree that it is really interesting. The perspective is different from all the many articles I have read from US writers. I have one question: what is G2?
I hadn’t heard that term before, but it seems very likely they are referring to the US+China.