The FT recently ran a widely shared column by Mr. Robin Harding, its Asia Editor, arguing that China is making trade “impossible”.
The column starts with a blunt question: What can the world still sell to China? Harding’s conversations in China — with economists, technologists, business leaders — all pointed to the same awkward answer: not much beyond commodities like soybeans and iron ore, which don’t help Europeans sleep at night. Some mentioned luxury goods, some mentioned higher education, and several even suggested that Europe should just let Chinese companies build factories there. But after running through all these options, Harding lands on a stark conclusion: “nothing.” Nothing that China truly wants to import, nothing it believes it cannot make better and cheaper on its own.
He does acknowledge, to his credit, that China still buys semiconductors, aircraft, advanced software, and high-end machinery — but then immediately frames China as the “resident doctor,” merely buying these goods until it can produce its own and eventually export them. And he concedes China’s insecurity caused by US export controls. All of this is reasonable analysis. Yet it leads him to a sweeping final diagnosis: “The only good solutions lie with Beijing,” because only China can fix its deflation, boost consumption, strengthen the renminbi, or curb industrial subsidies. The rest of the world, he argues, can only respond with either politically painful reforms that reduce welfare or protectionism.
This is where I think the framing needs a reset — not because Harding misses the right issues, but because he stops at exactly the moment the harder questions begin. He correctly identifies the pressures. But he underestimates the number of levers the West still has, and overestimates China’s ability (or willingness) to close every door forever. Most importantly, he jumps past the most basic principle of trade: if you want to sell, produce something worth buying. If you don’t, the customer goes elsewhere. Trade is reciprocal: you sell when your value is competitive; you buy when it isn’t. It’s astonishing how much geopolitical commentary often loses sight of this simple truth. Instead of complaining that the client no longer buys from you, maybe start by asking whether the product still holds up.
So let me offer three specific areas where the FT narrative — and much Western policy thinking — unnecessarily narrows the field.